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Frontier	Dynamics:	Reflections	on	Evangelical	and	Tablighi	Missions	
in	Central	Asia	
Mathijs	Pelkmans	
	
Abstract.	Missionaries	have	flocked	to	the	Kyrgyz	Republic	ever	since	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union.	
Evangelical-Pentecostal	and	Tablighi	missions	have	been	particularly	active	on	what	they	conceive	of	as	a	
fertile	post-atheist	frontier.	But	as	these	missions	project	their	message	of	truth	onto	the	frontier,	the	dangers	
of	the	frontier	may	overwhelm	them.	Based	on	long-term	ethnographic	fieldwork	amongst	foreign	and	local	
Tablighis	and	evangelical-Pentecostals,	this	article	formulates	an		analytic	of	the	frontier	that	highlights	the	
affective	and	relational	characteristics	of	missionary	activities	and	their	effects.	This	analytic	explains	why	and	
how	missionaries	are	attracted	to	the	frontier,	as	well	as	some	of	the	successes	and	failures	of	their	
expansionist	efforts.	In	doing	so	the	article	reveals	the	potency	of	instability,	a	feature	that	is	particularly	
evident	in	missionary	work,	but	resonates	with	other	frontier	situations.			
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1.	 Introduction	
By	way	of	introduction	let	me	revisit	an	encounter	from	the	early	stages	of	my	fieldwork	on	
missionary	activities.1	Back	then,	in	2003,	I	was	primarily	interested	in	the	conversion	of	
Kyrgyz	people	to	evangelical	Christianity	in	the	post-Soviet	period.	The	topic	of	Christian	
missionary	activity	tended	to	trigger	negative	comments	locally,	and	with	that	in	mind	I	
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entered	a	mosque	in	the	small	city	of	Karakol	in	north-eastern	Kyrgyzstan,	where	I	
approached	a	group	of	men	who	were	seated	on	the	floor.	Not	knowing	that	they	were	
involved	with	the	Islamic	missionary	movement	Tablighi	Jamaat,	I	was	surprised	that	my	
probing	into	their	views	of	Christian	missionaries	and	of	Muslims	converting	to	Christianity	
triggered	a	calm,	reflective	commentary.	They	told	me,	and	I	paraphrase	them	here:		
	
Those	converted	Kyrgyz	had	never	been	real	Muslims;	they	had	been	atheists,	Islam	
had	merely	been	culture	to	them.	After	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	Christians	
had	been	more	active	in	carrying	out	mission	work	than	Muslims;	but	this	is	changing	
now	that	more	Muslims	[such	as	themselves]	are	getting	involved	in	calling	people	
closer	to	Islam.	
	
The	response	surprised	me	because	it	suggested	a	different	attitude	to	religion	than	what	I	
had	become	accustomed	to.	Most	Kyrgyzstani	citizens	considered	Islam	to	be	as	inalienable	
from	Kyrgyz	culture	as	Christianity	from	Russian	culture.2	This	logic	had	allowed	for	a	truce	
between	what	in	Central	Asia	were	labelled	the	‘traditional	religions’:	Orthodox	Christianity	
and	mainstream	Sunni	Islam.	Its	dignitaries	proudly	pointed	out	that	in	Central	Asia	for	over	
a	century	their	religions	had	co-existed	in	peace,	each	taking	care	of	their	own.3	The	
Tablighis	rejected	this	set	of	ideas.	They	dismissed	the	popular	equation	of	religion	and	
ethnic	culture;	instead	they	embraced	the	idea	that	they	were	operating	in	an	open	religious	
field	(in	which	they	could	advance	their	‘exclusivist’	notions	of	faithful	belonging).	
Significantly,	their	ideas	about	the	separation	of	religion	and	culture	as	well	as	the	emphasis	
on	choice	in	individual	religious	trajectories	were	shared	by	evangelical	Christians	who	
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emphasized	ideas	of	freedom	and	civil	society,	and	who	depicted	post-Soviet	Kyrgyzstan	as	
a	religious	market,	a	mission	field	where	‘Cults	and	other	teachings	have	flooded	into	the	
country	as	the	harvest	field	is	ripe’.4		
As	the	conversation	proceeded	it	also	became	evident	that	the	Tablighis	engaged	
with	me	on	distinctly	unequal	terms.	They	did	not	consider	me	an	equal	conversation	
partner,	but	rather	a	potentially	responsive	listener	at	the	receiving	end	of	a	one-way	
communication	channel.5	They	positioned	themselves	as	the	bearers	of	an	unshakable	
truth,	and	expressed	certainty	through	their	calm	and	pensive	manner	of	speaking.	Sharing	
this	truth	with	others	was	what	had	brought	them	to	the	mosque.	They	were	‘travellers’	
participating	in	a	dawat	or	proselytizing	tour,	during	which	they	invited	others	to	the	right	
path,	meanwhile	strengthening	their	own	connection	with	God.	Although	their	calm	and	
self-contained	comportment	struck	me	as	different	from	the	often	more	expressive	style	of	
my	Pentecostal	Christian	acquaintances,	the	underlying	logic	was	similar:	it	was	about	
establishing	an	asymmetric	relationship	to	draw	listeners	into	a	religious	discourse	and	
direct	them	toward	the	truth.	
The	Tablighi	Jamaat	and	the	Church	of	Jesus	Christ	–	which	is	the	evangelical-
Pentecostal	church	that	I	have	followed	most	closely6	–	both	successfully	established	
themselves	in	Kyrgyzstan	in	the	1990s,	and	experienced	rapid	expansion	in	the	decades	
thereafter.	The	Tablighi	Jamaat	first	came	to	Kyrgyzstan	in	1992,	when	Tablighis	from	
Pakistan	visited	the	country	on	a	proselytizing	tour	and	introduced	a	small	group	of	Kyrgyz	
to	its	teachings	(Toktogulova	2014:	7).	Initially	the	movement	made	little	headway,	but	after	
around	the	year	2000	it	rapidly	expanded,	reaching	10,000	participants	by	2007,	most	of	
whom	were	ethnic	Kyrgyz	(Rotar	2007).	Since	then	its	growth	has	slowed	down,	with	
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alternating	periods	of	contraction	and	expansion	(Ismailbekova	and	Nasritdinov	2012:	186).	
The	trajectory	of	the	Church	of	Jesus	Christ	has	been	rather	similar.	It	was	established	in	
1991	by	a	small	group	of	Russians	who	had	become	dissatisfied	with	the	legalistic	approach	
and	inward-looking	atmosphere	in	the	Soviet-era	underground	Pentecostal	church	to	which	
they	had	belonged	until	then.	The	Church	grew	quickly	in	subsequent	years,	reaching	500	in	
1994	and	10,000	tithe-paying	members	in	2003.	The	number	of	church	members	–	of	whom	
approximately	40	percent	was	Russian	and	45	percent	Kyrgyz	–	stabilized	thereafter.7		
The	above	outlines	sound	straightforward	enough:	representatives	of	religious	
movements	enter	a	promising	‘mission	field’;	they	foster	a	religious	sensibility	that	places	
the	individual	at	centre	stage;	and	they	see	themselves	as	actors	operating	in	a	pluralistic	
environment	or	religious	market.	In	fact,	these	elements	resonate	with	writings	about	
trends	in	Islam	and	Christianity	worldwide,	and	according	to	Berger	are	central	to	the	
success	of	what	he	terms	‘passionate	religious	movements’	(1999:	2).	The	emphasis	on	the	
individual	is	not	only	evident	in	evangelical	notions	of	‘sincerity’	and	‘salvation’	(Bielo	2011;	
Coleman	and	Hackett	2015:	17);	framed	as	‘interiority’	and	the	‘moral	self’	they	are	at	the	
heart	of	new	Islamic	piety	movements	(Liberatore	2017:	213;	Mahmood	2005;	Roy	2006).	
Moreover,	their	person-centred	approach	is	congruent	with	the	rise	of	new	forms	of	
pluralism	in	the	age	of	globalization.8	Whether	or	not	one	agrees	with	the	argument	of	
several	sociologists	that	‘religious	pluralism	leads	to	the	religious	vitality	of	many	lively	
religious	groups’	(as	Bender	(2015:	66)	critically	summarizes	their	position),	there	are	clear	
affinities	between	the	person-centric	and	interiority-focused	teachings	of	‘passionate’	and	
‘neofundamentalist’	religious	movements	and	the	ideology	of	the	free	market	and	the	
reality	of	state	withdrawal	(see	also	Roy	2006).		
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In	fact,	these	trends	can	be	easily	mapped	onto	changes	in	the	religious	landscape	in	
Kyrgyzstan.	The	collapse	of	the	militantly	secular	Soviet	Union	and	the	adoption	of	liberal	
laws	allowed	for	religion	to	return	to	the	public	sphere,	and	for	a	range	of	religious	
movements	to	start	or	expand	their	activities.	Moreover,	the	dislocations	and	
disorientations	produced	by	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	welfare	state	can	safely	be	said	to	
have	increased	the	appeal	of	moral	communities	that	offered	clear	answers	to	personal	
predicaments.	On	the	surface,	then,	the	religious	dynamism	observed	in	post-Soviet	
Kyrgyzstan	affirms	the	prediction	of	market	theorists	of	religion	that	religious	liberalization	
and	pluralization	boosts	religious	activity	(e.g.	Stark	and	Finke	2000;	for	Kyrgyzstan,	Radford	
2015).	Moreover,	the	notions	of	pluralization,	individuation,	and	marketization	resonated	
with	how	Tablighis	and	Evangelical	presented	their	own	proselytising	activities	and	
defended	their	religious	rights	(see	also	Pelkmans	2009;	2014).	
And	yet,	this	conceptualization	tends	to	leave	important	aspects	of	missionizing	
unseen,	as	hinted	at	by	the	short	vignettes:	the	missionaries’	sense	of	superiority	and	the	
associated	asymmetries	in	communication;	the	expansionist	focus	in	trying	to	bring	the	
truth	to	the	‘lost’	and	the	‘unreached’	(that	is,	to	the	perceived	victims	of	Soviet	atheist	rule,	
and	to	those	who	never	had	the	opportunity	to	hear	the	relevant	religious	truth);	and	the	
affective	energies	released	by	the	missionaries’	conviction.	These	aspects	ought	to	be	
central	ingredients	of	an	approach	that	aims	to	understand	the	missionary	drive	and	more	
broadly	the	dynamics	of	religious	expansion	and	intensification.	Hence,	the	‘amorphous’	
notions	of	market,	pluralism,	and	personhood	need	to	be	augmented	by	a	more	relational	
conceptualization	of	the	social	field,	one	that	reflects	the	spatial	and	temporal	unevenness	
of	such	fields.	The	concept	of	the	frontier	holds	particular	promise,	as	it	draws	attention	to	
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the	relational	logics	of	connection	and	expansion	as	well	as	the	affective	dimensions	of	
potential	and	the	unknown.9		
In	order	to	integrate	these	dimensions,	I	develop	in	the	next	section	a	topological	
analytic	of	the	frontier;	one	that	is	concerned	with	the	consistency	and	elasticity	of	the	
social	field	(Mol	and	Law	1994:	643;	Law	1999).	Emphasizing	the	complexity	of	connection,	I	
hold	that	an	understanding	of	the	fluctuating	intensities	of	missionary	activity	on	the	
religious	frontier	requires	studying	how	connections	are	affectively,	morally,	and	
epistemically	constituted;	and	moreover	that	this	approach	can	shed	light	on	other	frontiers	
as	well.	Indeed,	the	drive	of	expansion,	sense	of	superiority,	and	conviction	of	truth	is	not	
unique	to	religious	missions,	but	resonates	with	political-economic	asymmetric	encounters,	
such	as	in	projects	of	state	encapsulation,	extractive	capitalist	expansion,	and	(neo-)imperial	
‘civilising	missions’.	Ultimately,	then,	by	scrutinizing	two	religious	missions,	this	article	aims	
to	unveil	some	of	the	mechanisms,	tensions,	and	connections	that	constitute	what	I	refer	to	
as	‘frontier	dynamics’.		
	
2.	The	Frontier	as	a	Topological	Object	
Topography	and	topology	both	concern	the	spatial	(from	the	Greek	topos),	but	otherwise	
have	little	in	common.	Topography	refers	to	acts	of	mapping	(categorizing,	classifying,	
enumerating)	attributes	across	a	surface,	whether	these	are	mountains,	rivers,	or	cities	in	a	
landscape,	or	people	and	institutions	in	a	social	field.	Topology,	by	contrast,	describes	the	
spatio-temporal	ordering	of	landscapes	or	social	fields:	it	concerns	the	consistency	of	these	
fields	and	the	behaviour	of	their	properties	in	relation	to	each	other.	In	an	early	piece	on	the	
matter,	Mol	and	Law	(1994)	clarify	this	by	differentiating	between	several	interrelated	
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topological	modalities:	‘regions’	are	about	clustering	and	binding;	‘networks’	are	about	
connectivity;	and	‘fluids’	allow	transformation	without	fracture	(1994:	642-43).	Their	point	is	
not	so	much	to	identify	topological	formats	as	to	reflect	on	the	complexity	of	spatio-
temporal	ordering.	Crucially,	this	ordering	impacts	not	only	the	elements	that	are	contained,	
but	the	dynamics	of	the	broader	social	field.	Analogously,	topological	reflection	on	the	
frontier	serves	the	goal	of	obtaining	a	better	grasp	of	the	social	and	ideational	dynamics	
that	drive	religious	missions.	
In	one	of	its	shorthand	definitions,	‘frontier’	refers	to	the	edge	of	a	formation.	James	
Scott,	for	instance,	talks	about	the	frontier	in	upland	Southeast	Asia	as	a	region	removed	
from	the	centres	of	power;	a	zone	of	refuge	and	freedom	that	thereby	fosters	more	
egalitarian	relationships	(2009:	19).	Frontier	is	also	used	as	an	alternative	for	‘boundary’,	
especially	to	emphasize	the	zonal	rather	than	linear	characteristics	of	the	meeting	points	
between	polities,	countries,	or	empires.	Thus,	for	Kopytoff	(1987)	the	African	frontier	refers	
to	the	margins	between	polities	–	which	he	describes	as	zones	of	turmoil	with	the	potential	
to	develop	into	new	societies	(1987:	5-7).	Directly	and	indirectly,	these	writings	bear	the	
mark	not	only	of	Leach’s	(1954)	description	of	an	escape	social	culture	that	was	itself	
unstable,	but	also	Owen	Lattimore’s	remark	that	‘it	is	not	surprising	that	the	ambivalent	
loyalties	of	frontier	people	are	always	conspicuous	and	historically	important’	(1968:	374).		
All	of	this	strongly	suggests	that	the	identified	creativity,	egalitarianism,	and	
ambivalence	are	not	simply	attributable	to	an	‘open’	or	‘free’	space	(as	in	the	idea	of	the	
market)	but	are	also	complex	responses	to	asymmetric	centre-periphery	relations.	That	is,	
frontier	activity	is	simultaneously	located	on	the	margins	and	entangled	in	networks	that	
extend	from	the	centre.	Moreover,	the	centre-periphery	relationship	is	always	a	contentious	
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one,	not	least	because	‘the	definition	of	the	frontier	as	“empty”	is	political	and	made	from	
the	intruders’	perspective’	(Kopytoff	1987:	25)	and	should	thus	not	be	accepted	as	fact.	
Indeed,	emptiness	and	wildness	do	not	have	stable	ontologies	but	are	the	unstable	product	
of	expansionist	visions	and	fantasies.	As	Anna	Tsing	puts	it,	frontiers	emerge	as	part	of	
efforts	to	‘create	wildness	so	that	some	–	and	not	others	–	may	reap	its	rewards’	(2005:	27).		
	 Another	definition	of	the	frontier	can	be	gleaned	from	offhanded	usage	of	the	term,	
such	as	when	academics	speak	of	‘frontiers	of	knowledge’,	investors	of	‘resource	frontiers’	
and	missionaries	of	‘mission	frontiers’.	In	their	different	ways,	they	are	all	evoking	the	idea	
of	potential	that	is	yet	to	be	realized.	This	issue	of	realization	resonates	with	recent	
attention	in	anthropology	to	how	life	projects	are	constituted	through	projections	of	the	
imagination	and	the	will.	Whether	this	takes	the	form	of	a	Heidegger-inspired	focus	on	
‘potentiality’	(e.g.	Gammeltoft	2013)	or	a	Deleuze-inspired	reflection	on	‘becoming’	(e.g.	
Biehl	and	Locke	2010),	they	share	a	future-oriented	emphasis	on	subject	formation,	where	
the	incomplete	present	is	constantly	refracted	through	its	engagement	with	that	which	is	
yet	to	come.	Frontiers	in	this	sense	are	‘horizons	of	the	imagination’,	offering	a	perspectival	
mechanism	by	which	an	unreachable	‘beyond’	animates	–	through	anxiety,	fear,	desire,	
hope	–	‘the	insistent	reality	of	the	here	and	now’,	as	Crapanzano	(2004:	14)	puts	it.		
	 A	useful	way	to	merge	these	two	understandings	of	the	frontier	is	to	revisit	Frederick	
Jackson	Turner’s	highly	problematic	yet	insightful	essay	‘The	Significance	of	the	Frontier	in	
American	History’	(1921).	His	ecologically	deterministic	Frontier	Thesis	holds	that	American	
society	emerged	as	the	product	of	the	conditions	of	the	frontier,	in	essence	that	the	
encounter	with	the	wilderness	and	the	abundance	of	open	land	pushed	individuals	to	
become	mobile,	self-reliant,	innovative,	and	merit-focused,	that	is,	adopting	characteristics	
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presumed	to	underpin	American	capitalism	and	democracy	(Bassin	1993:	486).	Even	though	
the	Frontier	Thesis	has	repeatedly	been	debunked,10	its	influence	has	continued	unabated.	
As	Limerick	puts	it,	the	Frontier	Thesis	has	been	‘exempted	from	the	usual	tests	of	
verification,	evidence,	and	accuracy’	(1995:	700).	There	seem	to	be	at	least	two	reasons	for	
this.	First,	Turner	formulated,	even	if	only	at	a	rudimentary	level,	a	topological	definition	of	
the	frontier	that	has	continued	to	trigger	the	analytic	imagination.	Second,	his	mythologized	
depiction	of	the	frontier	continues	to	hold	appeal	to	those	who	cast	themselves	as	pioneers	
of	sorts.	These	two	reasons	each	require	elaboration.	
Analytically,	Turner	touched	on	an	essential	point.	For	him,	the	frontier	was	not	just	
that	which	lies	at	the	margins,	but	rather	a	figuration	with	its	own	dynamic,	spurred	on	by	
the	possibilities	provided	by	the	receding	horizon	of	the	wilderness.	He	described	‘the	
frontier	[as]	the	outer	edge	of	the	wave’	(1921:	3),	and	later	in	his	essay	suggested	that	
there	are	multiple	frontiers,	‘series	of	waves’,	that	‘rolled	one	after	the	other’	(1921:	19).	
The	image	of	the	wave	powerfully	evokes	the	relational	and	affective	dimensions	that	
constitute	the	space-time	of	the	frontier.	The	frontier	is	a	figuration	that	–	like	a	wave	–	
builds	up,	extends	its	reach,	to	then	release	its	energy.	Scott	Lash’s	description	of	
topological	objects	fits	seamlessly:	‘through	their	own	energetics,	they	drive	their	own	space	
and	time’	(2012:	262).	Despite	the	many	faults	of	Turner’s	environmentally	deterministic	
model,	his	vision	of	the	frontier	as	a	forward-pushing	figuration	with	its	own	dynamic	
resonates	with	how	Anna	Tsing	conceptualizes	the	capitalist	frontier:	‘an	edge	of	space	and	
time:	a	zone	of	not	yet	–	not	yet	mapped,	“not	yet”	regulated’	(2003:	5100).	This	also	
indicates	that	the	frontier	is	temporally	confined	–	a	figuration	that	emerges	in	specific	
conditions	but	over	time	will	give	way	to	other	arrangements.		
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One	of	the	many	problematic	aspects	of	Turner’s	Frontier	Thesis	is	the	idealization	of	
the	colonist	and	the	frontier	conditions.	He	cites	the	colonist’s	presumed	‘love	of	the	
wilderness’	(1921:	22)	and	describes	how	at	‘the	meeting	point	between	savagery	and	
civilization’	(1921:	3)	the	colonist	‘slowly	transforms	the	wilderness’	(1921:	4)	to	create	a	
vibrant	new	society.	The	Frontier	Thesis	has	rightly	been	debunked	for	its	arrogance,	for	
diminishing	the	human	cost	of	colonization,	and	for	its	mythologized	and	essentialized	
depiction	of	the	American	nation.	It	is	always	crucial	to	remember	that	the	frontier	is	
experienced	radically	differently	by	the	colonized	and	the	dominated	(Anzaldua	1987).	But	
as	a	concept	the	frontier	is	useful	not	in	spite	of	but	because	of	its	politically	suspect	
connotations:	it	draws	attention	to	how	elites	refract	reality	through	their	prisms	of	
asserted	superiority	and	(assumed)	dominance.	Indeed,	the	elitist	bias	of	the	Frontier	Thesis	
is	precisely	why	it	resonates	with	that	of	settlers,	colonists,	and	indeed	missionaries,	and	
therefore	should	be	taken	serious	when	analysing	expansionist	projects.	After	all,	the	ideal	
of	expansion	and	the	conveyed	sense	of	superiority	were	evident	in	the	disposition	of	
Tablighis	and	evangelical-Pentecostals,	and	in	their	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	
invitation	and	evangelization.		
So,	how	does	Central	Asia,	and	Kyrgyzstan	specifically,	fit	in	these	discussions	of	the	
frontier?	Although	this	article	focuses	on	religious	missions	in	the	post-Soviet	period,	it	is	
not	irrelevant	that	Central	Asia	has	historically	often	been	placed	on	the	margins	of	larger	
civilizational	formations.	As	Andre	Gunder	Frank	put	it,	Central	Asia	appears	as	a	sort	of	
‘black	hole	in	the	middle	of	the	world’,	seen	by	historians	and	representatives	of	the	
surrounding	Chinese,	Persian,	and	Russian	civilizations	‘as	a	dark	tabula	rasa	on	which	
itinerant	monks,	mullahs,	and	artists	from	these	allegedly	civilized	areas	left	their	marks’	
(1992:	50).	Frank’s	aim	is	to	show	that	Central	Asia’s	interconnecting	position	actually	made	
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it	central	to	world	history,	but	here	it	is	the	image	of	Central	Asia	as	a	peripheral	frontier	
that	is	relevant.	For	Tsarist	Russia,	Central	Asia	was	its	internal	Orient	that	first	needed	to	be	
‘pacified’	and	then	‘civilized’,	all	the	while	serving	as	the	destination	point	for	waves	of	
European	settlers	(Brower	2003;	Khodarkovsky	2002).	Jumping	forward,	although	the	
Bolsheviks	presented	themselves	as	a	liberating	force,	they	looked	at	Central	Asia	through	a	
Eurocentric	prism,	treating	it	as	a	problematic	backwater	and	a	target	for	its	high	modernist	
civilising	mission,	as	a	result	of	which	‘inefficient’	pastoral	ways	of	life	would	be	replaced	by	
sedentary	and	modern	lifestyles.	Its	normative	standard	had	distinct	Russian	overtones,	
such	that	Islamic	practices	appeared	not	only	as	‘backward’	but	also	‘alien’	(Keller	2001:	xv).		
The	Soviet	regime	ultimately	failed	to	eradicate	Islam	in	Central	Asia,	but	its	anti-
religious	policies	and	efforts	to	create	a	secular	society	curtailed	and	destabilized	the	
position	of	Islam	(e.g.	Khalid	2007;	Louw	2007:	21;	Hann	and	Pelkmans	2009).	Not	
surprising,	therefore,	that	in	the	post-Soviet	aftermath	Central	Asia	once	again	emerged	as	a	
canvas	onto	which	a	range	of	‘civilising	missions’	projected	their	assumed	superiority.	
Kyrgyzstan	was	particularly	attractive	for	such	projections	because	its	fast	and	far-reaching	
deregulation	of	the	public	sphere	offered	more	scope	to	foreign-driven	activity	than	existed	
in	neighbouring	countries.11	It	became,	as	it	were,	a	‘laboratory’	for	testing	out	ideologies	–	
a	mission	field	for	democracy	champions	to	propagate	the	values	of	liberalism,	for	
development	specialists	to	demonstrate	the	efficiencies	of	the	free	market,	and	for	religious	
missionaries	to	proclaim	the	truth	and	promise	salvation	(Pelkmans	2017:	9).		
To	appreciate	the	features	of	this	new	mission	field,	it	is	essential	to	see	it	as	both	
project	and	margin.	Within	this	space,	religious	movements,	the	people	amongst	whom	
missionaries	work	and	the	techniques	they	deploy	should	not	be	viewed	as	discrete	and	
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separable	entities,	but	as	complexly	entangled	components.	Here	it	is	useful	to	return	to	
Law	and	Mol’s	(1994)	differentiation	of	social	topologies	into	those	of	region,	network,	and	
fluid.	As	a	‘region’	Kyrgyzstan	was	perceived	as	the	edge	of	a	formation,	a	loose	clustering	of	
‘former	communists’	or	‘bad	Muslims’.	Here,	missionaries	worked	to	insert	their	immutable	
truths,	thereby	extending	‘networks’	that	linked	them	to	their	home	congregation	or	
religious	centre.12	But	if	the	‘region’	is	thus	shot	through	by	a	‘network’	logic,	these	logics	
are	both	modified	by	the	‘fluid’	characteristics	of	praxis	(cf.	Mol	and	Law	1994:	658).	When	
missionary	activities	are	adjusted	to	new	contexts,	this	affects	not	only	the	consistency	of	
the	‘mission	field’	but	potentially	also	the	messages	and	techniques	of	missionizing.		
The	point	is	that	in	missionizing	these	different	relational	logics	combine	to	produce	
a	distinct	frontier	figuration.	Picking	up	on	Turner’s	(1921)	metaphor,	this	figuration	behaves	
like	a	wave	that	builds	momentum	and	pushes	forward,	but	is	always	at	risk	of	receding	or	
collapsing.	Here	we	see	an	additional	advantage	of	the	frontier	concept,	namely	that	it	
draws	attention	to	uncertainty	and	instability.	Or	to	use	the	words	of	an	influential	
evangelical	missiologist,	the	frontier	represents	that	‘beyond	which	we	must	go,	yet	beyond	
which	we	may	not	be	able	to	see	clearly’	(Winter	2005:155).	The	implied	difficulty	is	
amplified	by	the	fact	that	in	contrast	to	some	other	pioneers,	the	success	of	missionary	
work	is	dependent	on	establishing	meaningful	relations	with	the	‘other’.	Within	this	space	of	
un-clarity	and	uncertainty	mission	work	is	unstable,	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	as	
missionaries	move	deeper	into	the	frontier,	they	risk	being	increasingly	ignored,	potentially	
eroding	the	conviction	with	which	they	set	out.	Second,	the	frontier	may	overwhelm	the	
missionary	who	then,	as	it	were,	falls	over	to	the	other	side.	As	we	will	see,	missionary	
movements	have	devised	mechanisms	to	counteract	these	risks.	But	because	these	
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mechanisms	are	imperfect,	the	possibility	remains	that	missionary	advances	result	in	pyrrhic	
victories,	in	the	loss	of	conviction,	and	even	the	collapse	of	the	missionary	effort	as	a	whole.	
	
3.	 The	Drive	Forward	
Let	me	start	this	section	by	quoting	another	classical	definition	of	the	frontier,	this	one	by	
political	scientist	Ladis	Kristof,	who	reflects	on	the	term’s	usage	in	historical	discussions	of	
state	formation	and	expansion:	
		
[T]he	frontier	was	not	the	end	(‘tail’)	but	rather	the	beginning	(‘forehead’)	.	.	.	it	was	
the	spearhead	of	light	and	knowledge	expanding	into	the	realm	of	darkness	and	the	
unknown	…	pioneer	settlements	of	a	forward	moving	culture	bent	on	occupying	the	
whole	area	(Kristof	1959:	270).	
	
The	topological	qualities	of	the	frontier	are	unmistakably	present	in	this	definition.	The	
frontier	is	seen	as	the	extension	of	the	centre,	stretching	and	reaching	to	connect	with,	and	
overpower,	that	which	is	found	in	its	way.	As	such	it	powerfully	conveys	the	perspective	of	
the	settler,	the	pioneer,	or	the	missionary,	as	they	look	out	over	what	to	them	appears	as	
barren	land,	an	expanse	into	which	they	can	venture,	and	which	they	set	out	to	appropriate	
by	transforming	it,	a	process	through	which	they	are	themselves	rejuvenated.	This	vision	
closely	corresponds	with	the	definition	provided	by	the	already	mentioned	missiologist	who	
writes	that	mission	frontiers	are	‘related	to	the	glorification	of	God	in	all	the	nations	
(peoples)	of	the	world,	to	“open	their	eyes,	to	turn	them	from	darkness	to	the	light	and	
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from	the	power	of	Satan	to	God”	(Acts	26:	18)’	(Winter	2005:	155).	In	evangelical	discourse,	
the	frontier	refers	to	the	effort	of	spreading	the	Good	News	of	the	Gospel	to	those	who	
haven’t	heard	yet;	it	is	about	‘reaching	the	unreached’,	with	special	attention	to	the	Muslim	
world.13	So,	let	me	turn	to	these	evangelical	visions	first.	
	
Evangelical	visions	of	missionary	work	
Among	North	American	and	European	evangelicals,	the	opening	up	of	post-Soviet	Central	
Asia	as	a	potential	mission	field	triggered	significant	enthusiasm.	It	brought	together	two	
evangelical	dreams:	first	to	carry	the	Gospel	to	the	atheists	of	the	crumbling	Soviet	Union,	
and	second	to	establish	a	bridgehead	to	the	always	resistant	Muslim	world.	Numerous	
articles	appeared	in	evangelical	outlets	such	as	the	International	Journal	of	Frontier	
Missions;	14	congregations	in	the	U.S.	adopted	their	own	Central	Asian	‘unreached	people	
group’	to	turn	them	into	recipients	of	collective	prayer	and	sometimes	of	a	church-funded	
missionary	family;	and	a	range	of	mission	organizations	started	educational,	humanitarian,	
publishing,	and	legal	advice	programs	in	the	region	(see	van	Gorder	2009).	Within	Central	
Asia,	Kyrgyzstan	received	a	disproportionally	large	share	of	missionary	initiatives,	not	least	
because	between	1991	and	2008	the	country	imposed	few	obstacles	to	religious	activity.	
	 The	evangelical	expansionist	drive	was	encoded	in	the	design	of	the	evangelical-
Pentecostal	‘Church	of	Jesus	Christ’,	a	church	that	received	considerable	international	
support	but	was	led	by	Kyrgyzstani	pastors	(Russians	as	well	as	Kyrgyz).	Here,	missionizing	
was	not	an	external	or	specialized	activity,	but	an	integral	aspect	of	religious	practice,	as	
also	reflected	in	the	title	of	a	book	popular	among	church	members:	kazhdyi	khristianin	–	
missioner	(Every	Christian	is	a	Missionary).	The	book		details	how	through	prayer,	by	
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witnessing	to	neighbours	and	relatives,	and	by	taking	part	in	evangelization	activities,	so-
called	‘believers’	carry	out	their	religious	duty	and	realize	themselves	as	Christians.15	During	
church	services,	these	ideas	surfaced	not	only	in	sermons,	but	were	practiced	by	
congregants	who	were	invited	to	the	stage	to	share	their	personal	stories	of	having	
witnessed	God’s	grace	–	of	how	they	overcame	addictions	or	achieved	success	in	life.16	Most	
congregants	also	convened	weekly	in	smaller	prayer	groups	to	direct	their	spiritual	energies	
to	reach	out	to	politicians,	prisoners,	or	the	inhabitants	of	a	particular	district.	Promising	
church	members	were	encouraged	to	establish	their	own	congregation,	thereby	advancing	
missionary	work	to	all	corners	of	the	Kyrgyz	Republic.			
The	missionary	drive	and	the	pull	of	the	frontier	converged	in	the	person	of	pastor	
Kadyrjan.	Himself	being	of	Kyrgyz	Muslim	background,	Kadyrjan	had	come	to	faith	in	
Kyrgyzstan’s	capital	Bishkek	in	1996.	His	enthusiasm	and	his	talents	were	recognized	by	
senior	pastors	in	the	Church	of	Jesus	Christ,	with	the	result	that	he	rapidly	made	his	way	up	
the	church	ranks.	Three	years	later	he	was,	as	he	phrased	it,	‘called	by	God’	to	establish	his	
own	congregation;	he	and	his	family	moved	to	Jalalabad,	the	capital	of	a	province	(oblast)	
with	the	same	name	and	which	in	Kyrgyzstan	has	the	reputation	of	being	‘very	Islamic’.	
Kadyrjan	often	talked	about	the	obstacles	that	he	and	his	family	had	overcome:	they	had	
experienced	severe	shortage	of	money;	at	times	they	even	had	been	close	to	starvation;	the	
local	population	had	initially	taken	him	and	his	wife	for	shamans;	the	premises	they	rented	
for	church	activities	were	declared	unavailable	time	and	again.	Through	elaborating	on	
these	and	other	difficulties	Kadyrjan	presented	himself	as	a	pioneer,	a	tool	in	the	hands	of	
God,	enlisted	in	a	mission	to	defeat	the	dark	forces	that	surrounded	his	congregation.	
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This	self-righteous	attitude,	which	was	based	on	a	perceived	contrast	between	the	
‘spearhead	of	light’	and	the	‘realm	of	darkness’	(Kristof	1959),	shone	through	strongly	in	
many	of	my	conversations	with	Kadyrjan.	‘You	should	imagine	what	the	city	looked	like	
when	we	first	arrived’,	he	told	me.	‘Garbage	was	not	collected	for	weeks,	the	streets	were	
littered.	And	it	was	pitch	dark	at	night.	No	street	lights.	Back	then	you	would	sit	at	home	
listen	to	the	dogs	howling	outside’.	Kadyrjan	emphasized	that	partly	through	the	active	
prayer	of	his	congregation,	the	city	had	started	to	prosper.	If	previously	the	bazaar	had	
resembled	a	filthy	swamp,	its	unhygienic	market	stalls	were	increasingly	being	replaced	by	
proper	‘European’	shops.	Moreover,	he	claimed,	crime	levels	had	fallen	since	God’s	work	
had	started	to	enlighten	the	city.	And	not	unimportantly,	his	congregation	had	flourished,	
counting	250	tithe-paying	members	in	2004,	the	majority	of	whom	were	ethnic	Kyrgyz.	With	
these	successes	under	his	belt,	the	new	frontier	for	Kadyrjan	consisted	of	the	smaller	
settlements	in	the	region.	Of	these	the	mining	town	of	Kokjangak	stood	out.	In	his	sermons	
he	dwelled	on	the	various	evil	spirits	that	still	kept	this	town	in	their	‘ice	cold’	grip.	
Conquering	Kokjangak	(in	the	sense	of	establishing	a	thriving	congregation)	would	deliver	a	
decisive	blow	to	Satan,	and	thus	not	only	save	the	converted	but	achieve	an	important	
victory	for	Jesus	in	the	region.	
Kadyrjan	certainly	was	not	the	only	missionary	preoccupied	with	the	ultimate	
frontier.	In	the	evangelical	expat	community	in	Bishkek,	there	was	always	much	interest	in	
how	congregations	in	the	provinces	were	doing,	especially	in	the	‘Islamic’	south,	just	like	
there	was	a	lot	of	talk	about	how	Kyrgyzstan	would	serve	as	a	bridgehead	for	missionary	
work	elsewhere.	Several	American	missionaries	were	preparing	for	mission	work	among	the	
Kyrgyz	minority	in	China,	who	were	deemed	truly	‘unreached’,	whereas	others	focused	their	
attention	on	training	Kyrgyz,	Uyghur,	and	Uzbek	church	members	for	missionary	work	in	
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settings	seen	as	particularly	hostile.	Because	of	this,	there	was	deep	fascination	with	
Shavkat,	the	pastor	of	a	small	Uzbek	congregation.	Uzbeks	had	proven	to	be	more	resistant	
to	evangelization	than	Kyrgyz,	but	Shavkat	and	his	family	had	stood	fast	in	the	face	of	
communal	ostracizing,	attempted	eviction,	and	even	death	threats.	The	case	of	Shavkat	was	
seen	as	a	litmus	test,	and	hence	it	was	no	surprise	that	dozens	of	foreign	missionaries	and	
Kyrgyzstani	Christians	from	other	regions	travelled	to	Shavkat’s	village	to	offer	their	visible	
support	by	attending	a	‘circumcision	party’	in	honour	of	his	son.17	Shavkat	and	his	family	
were	proper	heroes	for	the	evangelical	community,	frequently	brought	up	in	conversation,	
and	actively	supported.		
These	stories	about	opposition,	heroic	suffering,	and	anticipated	victory	had	an	
invigorating	effect	–	they	were	inspirational,	thereby	contributing	to	the	cohesiveness	of	the	
group,	and	reinforcing	the	idea	that	congregants	were	God’s	chosen	people.	The	productive	
tension,	which	is	a	key	element	of	frontier	dynamics,	clearly	shone	through	when	Kadyrjan	
told	me	with	an	air	of	mischievous	enthusiasm:	‘We	pray	[for	local	officials]	to	stop	
hindering	us.	But	that	may	not	be	God’s	way.	Our	faith	thrives	when	it	is	being	repressed’.		
	
Tablighi	visions	of	dawat	or	invitation		
The	Tablighi	Jamaat	originated	in	the	1920s	in	North	India	as	a	response	to	Hindu	attempts	
to	‘reconvert’	nominal	Muslims	to	Hinduism	(Metcalf	2003:	137),	and	developed	its	focus	
‘on	conversion	of	non-Muslims	to	Islam	[...]	in	reaction	to	European	Christian	missions’	
(Masud	2000:	xxvi).	Hence,	missionizing	has	been	an	integral	part	of	the	method	of	tabligh	
(literally,	‘conveying	the	message’),	a	method	aimed	at	fostering	spiritual	regeneration.	Its	
model	is	built	around	the	practice	of	dawat.	It	is	worthwhile	to	briefly	reflect	on	this	term	
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and	its	derivation	from	the	Arabic	da‘wa,	which	literally	translates	as	inviting	or	calling.	In	
his	book	on	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	the	prominent	Islamic	theologian	Muhammad	Masud	points	
out	that	da‘wa	means	mission	when	used	to	refer	to	the	practice	of	inviting	others	to	the	
truth	(2000:	xxi).	He	elaborates	that	in	the	Qur’an	the	term	‘da’wa	combines	two	acts	
simultaneously:	invitation	and	claim.	When	someone	invites	another	to	God	he	also	claims	
the	truth	of	his	mission’.	This	dovetails	with	how	the	term	is	used	in	Kyrgyzstan,	where	
becoming	a	Tablighi	is	referred	to	as	becoming	a	dawatchi	–	someone	who	goes	on	dawat.18	
According	to	the	method	of	Tabligh,	dawatchis	should	strive	to	devote	one	evening	a	week	
to	dawat,	take	part	in	a	three-day	dawat	each	month,	a	forty-day	dawat	each	year,	and	go	
abroad	on	a	three-month	dawat	once	in	a	lifetime.	In	Kyrgyzstan	it	was	rare	for	dawatchis	to	
achieve	and	maintain	perfect	regularity,	but	the	efforts	to	live	up	to	this	ideal	had	
nevertheless	produced	an	impressive	forward-moving	network.		
	 The	strength	of	the	Tablighi	network,	similar	to	that	of	the	Church	of	Jesus	Christ,	is	
that	its	missionaries	are	not	external	or	separate,	but	constitutive	of	the	movement	as	a	
whole.	If	for	the	Pakistani	Tablighis,	who	first	visited	Kyrgyzstan,	Central	Asia	was	attractive	
because	its	Muslim	population	led	largely	irreligious	lives,	the	same	logic	is	replicated	in	the	
now	largely	indigenized	movement,	not	least	through	its	emphasis	on	doing	dawat	in	
destitute	and	peripheral	settings	(Toktogulova	2014).	The	focus	on	missionizing	is	
omnipresent	at	Tablighi	mosques,	for	example	when	after	the	Friday	prayers	congregants	
are	encouraged	to	express	the	intention	to	go	on	dawat	at	a	specified	time	in	the	near	
future.		And	when	congregants	talk	with	each	other,	they	often	start	by	exchanging	
information	about	their	involvement	in	previous	dawats.	Such	travelling	experiences	lend	
authority,	and	those	who	have	taken	part	in	longer	(40-day	or	3-month)	dawats	are	likely	to	
be	chosen	as	amir	(leader)	of	a	new	jamaat	or	team.	
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It	is	during	these	tours,	travels,	or	dawats	that	the	pioneering	sensation	is	
particularly	palpable.	Three-day	dawats	typically	depart	from	the	mosque	after	the	Friday	
prayers,	when	ideally	six	but	up	to	ten	men	will	travel	to	their	assigned	destination.	They	
collect	a	small	amount	of	money	from	each	dawatchi,	after	which	they	travel	by	car	or	
(more	often)	public	transport	to	the	mosque	in	the	relevant	village	or	town,	where	they	
usually	arrive	unannounced.	Trying	to	find	one’s	bearings	in	unfamiliar	surroundings,	
needing	to	prepare	food	with	minimal	resources,	taking	care	of	personal	hygiene	in	largely	
abandoned	mosques,	and	sleeping	on	wooden	planks	generates	a	sense	of	improvisation,	
hardship	and	adventure.	Several	dawatchis	compared	the	experience	to	the	Soviet	summer	
camps	(lager)	that	they	had	experienced	in	their	youth,	and	they	stressed	that	the	first	day	
was	often	challenging.	In	the	words	of	one	dawatchi:	‘When	you	arrive	at	the	mosque	you	
never	know	what	to	expect,	you	need	to	make	do	with	the	few	available	things.	We	buy	
some	basic	food	and	that	is	it. And	yet,	nowhere	does	food	taste	as	good	as	on	dawat’.		
While	much	time	on	these	trips	is	devoted	to	prayer	and	study,	what	stands	out	are	
the	encounters	with	local	residents	and	state	officials.	These	encounters	are	instantly	
transformed	into	stories,	and	mixed	with	stories	from	previous	dawats,	often	in	an	effort	to	
generate	an	image	of	successful	heroism.	As	Metcalf	points	out,	‘Although	the	promise	of	
paradise	and	reward	is	alluded	to	in	the	stories,	it	is	the	compelling	account	of	heroic	
commitment	at	any	cost	that	serve	to	communicate	the	truth	and	urgency	of	embracing	the	
models	that	are	held	out’	(1993).	During	the	dawats	in	which	I	took	part	numerous	stories	
were	exchanged	about	encounters	with	suspicious	officials,	including	one	about	how	the	
previous	year	a	group	of	travellers	had	been	taken	into	custody,	until	the	intervention	of	a	
local	Tablighi	not	only	allowed	for	their	release	but	also	resulted	in	a	copious	meal	as	
compensation.	The	story	was	concluded	by	pointing	out	how	difficult	it	is	for	police	officers	
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and	other	officials	to	give	up	their	sinful	lives.	Nevertheless,	the	very	presence	of	dawatchis	
would	encourage	such	officials	to	reflect	on	the	way	they	conduct	themselves,	and	possibly	
change	their	lives	in	the	future.	Such	stories	were	part	of	the	missionary	project:	they	
pushed	discursively	into	the	frontier	by	outlining	the	sequence	through	which	others	would	
be	brought	onto	the	right	path.	
***	
These	descriptions	show	that	Tablighi	and	evangelical	praxis	are	saturated	with	ideas	that	
resonate	with	the	concept	of	the	frontier.	The	missionaries	saw	themselves	as	‘the	
spearhead	of	light	and	knowledge	expanding	into	the	realm	of	darkness’;	moreover	their	
organizations	were	configured	such	as	to	arrive	at	‘occupying	the	whole	area’	(Kristof	1959).	
The	topological	features	of	the	frontier	emerged	as	a	product	of	tensions	between	
missionary	projections	and	the	actuality	of	missionary	work,	which	intensified	a	sense	of	
purpose	in	these	religious	practitioners.	Indeed,	for	the	missionaries	there	was	a	real	allure	
in	the	frontier,	in	the	idea	of	moving	into	hostile	area,	into	a	land	in	the	grip	of	Satan	or	a	
terrain	ravaged	by	decades	of	Soviet	destructive	modernization.	On	the	frontier	they	felt	
that	their	presence	mattered,	allowing	their	lives	to	be	filled	with	religious	purpose.	It	was	
invigorating	because	the	observed	destitution,	hopelessness,	and	immorality	allowed	their	
own	truths	to	be	confirmed.	Moreover,	the	challenges	strengthened	the	idea	of	being	a	
revolutionary	force	destined	to	overcome	difficulties	and	opposition.	Still,	these	challenges	
can	become	overwhelming,	at	which	point	they	may	have	an	erosive	instead	of	an	
invigorating	effect.	If	so	far	expansion	and	dominance	have	been	taken	for	granted,	it	is	
crucial	to	acknowledge	that	on	the	frontier	nothing	is	stable.	
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4.		 Dangers	of	the	Frontier	
Let	me	resort	once	more	to	Turner’s	‘The	Frontier	in	American	History’,	specifically	where	
he	speaks	of	the	relationship	between	the	pioneer	and	his	surroundings:	
	
Little	by	little	he	transforms	the	wilderness,	but	the	outcome	is	not	the	old	Europe	
[but]	a	new	product	that	is	American.	[That	is,]	the	wilderness	masters	the	colonist	
(Turner	1921:	4).	
	
For	Turner,	this	‘becoming’	the	wilderness	is	really	only	a	first	step	of	a	coming	into	its	own.	
That	is,	by	shedding	the	European	ballast	and	by	absorbing	qualities	of	his	surroundings	the	
colonist	transforms	himself	and	the	wilderness	into	something	new.	Translating	this	to	the	
religious	frontier	is	not	straightforward.	Missionaries	need	to	tread	carefully,	because	any	
‘mutual	enrichment’	resulting	from	frontier	encounters	may	contain	the	seeds	of	heresy	
(bid’ah	and	syncretism).	So	how	should	we	see	the	above	quotation	in	relation	to	missionary	
work?	When	is	it	that	the	integrity	of	the	pioneer	is	lost?	And	how	does	this	work	when	the	
encounter	is	not	so	much	with	the	wilderness,	but	with	people	holding	different	ideas	about	
the	transcendental?	
On	the	frontier	the	differentials	between	perceived	superiority	and	inferiority	are	
simultaneously	very	pronounced	and	at	risk	of	collapsing	or	overturning.	The	sense	of	
superiority	was	reflected	in	the	‘pioneers’’	discourse	as	well	as	their	comportment.	It	was	
audible	in	the	soft-spoken	certainty	of	the	dawatchis	and	the	unwavering	exclamations	of	
pastor	Kadyrjan;	and	it	was	palpable	in	the	pioneers’	fascination	with	heroic	believers	and	in	
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their	patronizing	attitude	towards	struggling	non-believers.	With	each	step	deeper	into	the	
frontier	their	sense	of	superiority	tends	to	grow,	as	it	were,	precisely	because	this	reveals	
ever	larger	contrasts	with	the	pioneer’s	truth	or	‘civilization’.	And	yet,	as	the	distance	from	
the	centre	increases	with	each	step,	the	pioneer	becomes	more	vulnerable,	rendering	
missionary	work	inherently	unstable.	One	reason	for	why	this	is	so	is	because	the	descent	
into	the	frontier	tends	to	have	a	schizophrenic	quality	–	the	sense	of	superiority	often	
married	to	a	sense	of	fascination	with	the	other.19	Hence	there	are	two	main	dangers	
associated	with	the	frontier.	The	first	is	that	the	pioneer	or	missionary	becomes	merely	a	
voice	in	the	desert,	increasingly	ignored	by	those	they	encounter,	which	undermines	the	
confidence	on	which	missionary	work	is	built	–	missionary	work	may	implode	as	a	result.	The	
second	danger	is	that	the	pioneer	becomes	overwhelmed	by	the	frontier,	and	falls	or	steps	
over	to	the	other	side.	That	is,	if	the	encounter	with	the	other	‘masters	the	colonist’,	it	
potentially	explodes	missionary	work.	In	topological	terms,	when	missionary	work	is	
stretched	too	thin,	the	frontier	risks	losing	its	energizing	elasticity	or	even	be	folded	into	a	
different	logic.	These	dangers	are	recognized	by	the	pioneers	themselves,	which	makes	
reflecting	on	them	all	the	more	interesting.	
	
Tablighis	undermined	
The	renewed	visibility	of	Islam	in	public	life	since	the	late	1990s	has	been	a	contentious	
issue	in	Kyrgyzstan.	Tablighis	are	often	held	up	as	examples	of	the	perceived	danger	of	
increased	‘fanaticism’,	not	least	because	their	appearance	(untrimmed	beards	and	some	in	
white	robes)	as	well	as	their	practice	of	going	door-to-door	make	them	stand	out.	It	is	in	
light	of	this	that	the	deputy	director	of	the	State	Committee	of	Religious	Affairs	told	me	that	
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he	was	grateful	that	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	had	a	negative	image	among	the	public	at	large	–	
this	would	keep	the	movement	in	check	without	the	state	having	to	interfere.20	In	his	words,	
‘when	the	Tablighis	knock	on	someone’s	door	the	usual	comment	is	“be	gone”	(poshel-ty)’.	
Dismissive	attitudes	were	indeed	common.	During	my	participation	in	three	dawats	we	
made	daily	rounds	through	the	villages	to	invite	inhabitants	to	the	afternoon	prayer,	but	
only	very	rarely	was	the	invitation	accepted	and	followed	up	by	the	invitee	actually	showing	
up	at	the	mosque.	The	far	more	common	response	was	for	the	addressee	to	wait	until	the	
speaker	had	finished,	to	then	either	briskly	express	disinterest	or	politely	decline	the	
invitation.		
Such	negative	and	evasive	responses	were	not	described	as	problematic	by	the	
dawatchis.	According	to	the	Tablighi	code,	‘the	duty	of	the	preacher	ends	with	the	
communication	of	the	message’	(Masud	2000:	xxi).	I	encountered	a	rather	extreme	example	
of	the	above	when	conversing	with	a	group	of	dawatchis	in	the	destitute	former	mining	
town	of	Ak-Tiuz.	Although	they	already	had	been	in	the	town	for	two	days,	not	only	was	I	
the	first	person	to	come	to	their	makeshift	mosque	in	an	abandoned	building,	I	was	also	the	
first	with	whom	they	had	an	actual	conversation.	The	dawatchis	mentioned	being	struck	by	
the	level	of	public	drunkenness	in	the	town	and	what	to	them	appeared	as	the	sexual	
availability	of	female	residents.	The	fact	that	the	local	population	ignored	them	did	not	
mean	that	their	mission	trip	was	a	failure.	As	they	explained	to	me,	even	their	mere	
presence	would	leave	behind	‘footprints’	and	thereby	prepare	the	ground	for	future	
missionary	work.	And	there	was	more	to	it.	Several	weeks	later	I	spoke	with	one	of	these	
dawatchis	about	his	experience.	He	emphasized	that	the	rampant	alcoholism	and	severe	
destitution	they	had	encountered	in	Ak-Tiuz	had	made	him	very	aware	of	the	emptiness	and	
hopelessness	of	a	life	without	God.	The	experience	had	spiritually	invigorated	him.	
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It	is	justified	to	say	that	the	method	of	Tabligh	was	particularly	well	suited	to	avert	
the	dangers	of	the	frontier.	Their	dawatchis	or	travellers	never	ventured	alone	into	the	
unknown	and	risk	being	swallowed	up	by	the	frontier.	All	their	activities	–	travelling	to	new	
places,	inviting	people	to	the	mosque,	eating	and	sleeping	–	were	carried	out	in	the	
company	of	fellow	travellers.	This	provided	an	internal	sounding	board	even	when	there	
was	no	external	audience.	Their	forays	into	the	unknown	were	always	short,	retreating	to	
more	familiar	surroundings	(or	moving	to	another	mosque)	after	three	days.	What	is	more,	
the	home	mosque	and	the	team	of	travellers	were	presented	as	the	very	opposite	of	the	
frontier	–	a	‘safe	haven’	to	which	the	Tablighis	return	to	find	refuge	from	the	bruising	
experiences	of	ordinary	life.21	To	put	this	in	topological	terms,	dawat	was	organized	as	an	
‘immutable	mobile’,	which	purported	to	replicate	the	logic	of	the	centre	by	teleporting	it	
into	the	frontier	(cf.	Mol	and	Law	1994).		
Ironically,	it	was	in	the	familiar	surroundings	of	the	home	and	the	everyday	that	
more	consequential	dangers	appeared	to	be	hiding.	As	suggested,	in	the	face	of	‘danger’	
conviction	was	maintained	by	the	existence	of	an	internal	sounding	board,	an	underlying	
structure.	But	it	was	exactly	this	that	was	still	wanting	in	the	everyday	lives	to	which	many	
Kyrgyzstani	dawatchis	returned	after	their	travels	(see	also	Nasritdinov	2012:	157).	Being	
alone	with	unresponsive	family	members,	with	the	demands	of	work	in	a	largely	secular	
society,	and	with	wives	who	were	hostile	to	Tablighi	ideas,	many	struggled	to	keep	up	their	
motivation.	It	was	not	without	reason	that	the	following	joke,	with	a	serious	undertone,	was	
popular	among	my	Tablighi	acquaintances:	‘The	largest	obstacle	to	dawat	in	Kyrgyzstan	is	
Kyrgyz	women’.	
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This	was	certainly	how	my	acquaintance	Kanat	experienced	his	predicament.	He	
would	muse	about	how	much	easier	his	life	would	have	been	if	he	had	married	a	‘real	
Muslim	girl’.	By	contrast,	his	actual	wife	Gulnaz	derided	what	she	saw	as	his	excessive	
involvement	with	the	Tablighi	Jamaat.	When	I	asked	her	what	she	thought	about	the	
movement,	she	replied	in	a	dismissive	and	condescending	tone	of	voice:	‘Never	will	I	join	
them.	Their	idea	of	a	woman	is	to	be	submissive,	to	serve	her	husband,	and	to	stay	at	home	
with	the	children’.	It	was	not	long	after	these	conversations	that	Kanat	stopped	going	on	
dawat,	explaining:	‘My	work	and	marriage	really	started	to	suffer.	I	saw	it	happen	with	
others	–	they	lost	their	jobs,	got	divorced.	So	I	am	trying	to	rebalance	my	life	now’.	
The	point	here	is	that	while	the	Tablighi	model	enabled	the	dawatchis	to	withstand	
frontier	dangers,	the	viability	of	its	frontier	activities	depended	on	the	stability	of	the	basis	
from	which	these	activities	were	launched.	This	can	be	further	illustrated	with	comments	
that	Kyrgyzstani	and	Pakistani	dawatchis	made	about	each	other	during	a	joint	dawat.	
According	to	the	Kyrgyzstanis,	the	most	significant	difference	was	that	the	Pakistani	had	
been	born	and	raised	in	Islam.	They	admired	the	Pakistani	for	their	certainty	and	stability	in	
matters	of	faith.	And	they	complained	about	their	own	difficulties	of	having	grown	up	during	
atheist	times	and	living	in	a	largely	secular	society.	By	contrast,	the	Pakistani	expressed	
amazement	about	the	intensity	with	which	Kyrgyzstanis	were	able	to	live	their	faith,	and	
they	repeatedly	commented	on	their	fervour	and	energy.		
These	comments	suggest	that	for	Kyrgyzstanis,	the	dawat	experience	was	so	intense	
because	the	men	felt	a	release	from	their	everyday	commitments,	and	yet	this	was	also	why	
it	tended	to	remain	a	‘bracketed	reality’.	Sustainable	religious	expansion	depended	at	least	
partly	on	a	strengthening	of	the	basis	from	which	this	expansion	took	place.	A	more	‘fertile’	
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societal	basis	was	certainly	in	the	making	in	Kyrgyzstan.	For	example,	Reetz	points	out	that	
more	and	more	positions	of	influence	–	including	those	related	to	policy	making	–	are	
occupied	by	Tablighis	or	people	favourably	disposed	to	the	movement	(2014:	135,	140).		
The	desire	to	strengthen	the	Tablighi	network	in	society	also	translated	to	everyday	
practice.	Kanat	often	made	a	point	of	helping	out	his	fellow	dawatchis,	for	example,	by	
buying	from	their	shops	and	hiring	their	labour	for	home	renovation	work.	Among	my	
interlocutors	there	was	an	optimistic	sense	that	even	the	numerous	people	who	had	
discontinued	their	involvement	would	play	a	positive	role.	As	one	put	it,	those	who	
discontinued	‘still	have	acquired	some	understanding	of	Islam	and	of	our	method	–	that	will	
make	society	more	open	to	us’.	Nevertheless,	for	the	moment	the	gap	between	life	among	
Tablighi	brothers	during	mission	trips	and	life	at	home	continued	to	loom	large	for	many	of	
the	dawatchis.		And	this	had	both	invigorating	and	destabilizing	effects.	
	
Evangelicals	overwhelmed	
In	contrast	to	the	six	to	ten	people	strong	teams	of	the	Tablighis,	the	ultimate	evangelical	
hero	is	the	lone	missionary.	Similar	to	mythologized	portrayals	of	the	anthropologist,	the	
missionary	is	presented	as	facing	challenges,	sticking	it	out,	and	emerging	victoriously.22	But	
as	with	anthropologists,	there	is	always	the	danger	of	going	native.	A	remarkable	example	of	
this	was	Richard/Risbek,	an	American	missionary	who	as	part	of	his	preparation	spent	over	a	
year	living	in	a	remote	Kyrgyzstani	town.	He	told	me	that	during	that	year	he	fell	in	love	with	
Kyrgyz	culture	and,	impressed	with	the	‘spiritual	richness’	of	its	people,	became	convinced	
that	the	Kyrgyz	were	one	of	the	Lost	Tribes	of	Israel.	To	prove	this	idea	he	embarked	on	a	
lengthy	study	of	the	Kyrgyz	Manas	epic,	dwelling	on	similarities	with	biblical	stories	to	
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hypothesize	that	the	epic	and	the	bible	derived	from	the	same	source.23	Richard/Risbek	was	
controversial	in	evangelical	circles	because	his	ideas	demonstrated	to	some	that	
‘contextualization’	had	turned	into	‘syncretism’,	meaning	that	efforts	to	make	the	biblical	
message	locally	meaningful	and	relevant	had	ended	up	corrupting	the	message,	which	
therefore	was	no	longer	biblical.	The	discomfort	was	mutual.	From	Richard/Risbek’s	
perspective,	the	problem	was	that	many	foreign	missionaries	were	dogmatic	in	their	faith,	
which	he	feared	would	introduce	the	same	kind	of	divisions	within	Protestantism	as	exist	
elsewhere,	and	which	would	overshadow	the	spiritual	message.	Instead	of	aiming	to	convert	
the	Kyrgyz	to	Christianity,	Richard/Risbek’s	hope	was	for	the	Kyrgyz	to	reach	‘the	peak	of	
their	religion’,	and	become	Muslim	‘followers	of	Jesus’.	
A	different	kind	of	frontier	danger	was	experienced	by	Gulbarchyn,	a	Kyrgyz	woman	
in	her	late	twenties	who	in	2004	had	been	sent	by	the	aforementioned	pastor	Kadyrjan	to	
serve	as	a	missionary	in	the	mining	town	of	Kokjangak	and	establish	a	congregation	of	the	
Church	of	Jesus	Chris.	After	a	few	months	during	which	the	prayer	groups	she	organized	
were	well	attended,	this	new	congregation	started	to	dwindle.	During	my	last	encounter	
with	Gulbarchyn	we	talked	at	length	about	the	difficulties	of	living	in	a	place	whose	
residents	were	either	hostile	or	indifferent	to	her	presence	and	about	how	her	difficulties	
were	confounded	by	the	partial	disintegration	of	the	congregation.	She	confided	in	me:	‘I	
know	that	we	will	grow	if	we	pray	and	work,	but	often	I	have	this	thought	[embarrassed	
laugh],	this	strong	thought	that	I	want	to	move	away	from	here…	I	just	don’t	know’.	She	
sounded	despondent	to	me	and	hence	I	was	not	surprised	when	the	following	year	I	was	
informed	that	Gulbarchyn	had	left	town	to	return	to	her	parental	home.	
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One	of	the	ironies	of	the	frontier	was	that	evangelical	missionaries	themselves	
increasingly	became	the	target	of	Islamic	mission	work.	Pastor	Bolot,	who	in	2016	was	
leading	a	struggling	congregation,	told	me:	‘these	dawatchis	visit	us	all	the	time.	They	talk	to	
my	wife	and	my	daughters,	telling	them	that	the	Kyrgyz	have	always	been	Muslim	and	that	I	
should	come	to	the	mosque.	The	result	is	that	people	become	afraid.	They	want	to	follow	
Jesus,	but	they	don’t	dare	to	anymore’.	Bolot	and	his	family	were	holding	out,	but	he	
depicted	the	current	times	as	one	of	perseverance	in	which	God	was	testing	their	faith,	and	
which	stood	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	situation	fifteen	years	previously	when	there	had	been	
‘a	real	surge’	and	the	congregation	was	filled	with	energy.	
The	examples	above	illustrate	what	can	happen	when	the	frontier’s	invigorating	
qualities	become	overshadowed	by	its	destabilizing	effects:	Richard/Risbek	saw	himself	cut	
off	from	his	evangelical	home	(through	accusations	of	syncretism);	Gulbarchyn	lost	her	
sense	of	purpose	and	broke	off	her	mission	to	Kok-Jangak;	Bolot’s	congregation	turned	
inward	in	the	face	of	overwhelming	opposition.	All	of	this	speaks	to	the	fragility	of	
conviction	on	the	frontier,	but	it	does	not	mean	that	the	invigorating	qualities	are	
unavoidably	lost.	At	this	point	it	is	useful	to	return	to	pastor	Kadyrjan,	when	he	reflected	on	
the	size	of	his	congregation,	which	at	the	time	counted	250	tithe	paying	members:		
	
If	you	would	add	up	all	the	people	who	converted	in	our	church,	you	would	probably	
get	to	eight	hundred	people.	It	happens	all	the	time.	People	join	the	church,	and	
then	suddenly	they	say	that	they	no	longer	have	time.	And	that’s	the	end	of	it.	What	
happens	is	that	the	‘open’	people	come	to	our	church,	but	then	relatives	and	others	
start	to	put	pressure	on	this	person,	trying	to	convince	them	that	they	should	not	go	
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to	the	church,	offer	money	so	that	they	won’t	go,	and	if	that	doesn’t	help,	they	will	
ostracize	them.	It	is	the	usual	thing;	persecution	is	part	of	Christianity.	We	pray	[for	
local	officials]	to	stop	hindering	us.	But	that	may	not	be	God’s	way.	Our	faith	thrives	
when	it	is	being	repressed.		
	
Kadyrjan’s	reflections	showed	an	awareness	of	both	the	invigorating	and	destabilizing	forces	
of	the	frontier.	And	in	line	with	the	general	vision	of	the	Church	of	Jesus	Christ,	Kadyrjan’s	
approach	for	dealing	with	the	contradiction	was	to	remain	on	the	offensive,	adopting	a	
forward	moving	strategy	in	which	constantly	new	battles	were	sought	and	a	pioneer	
mentality	was	fostered.	Numerous	people	fell	by	the	wayside,	but	that	was	only	to	be	
expected	because	not	everyone	is	chosen	to	be	saved.	As	the	church	moved	deeper	into	the	
frontier,	the	risks	and	failures	multiplied.	The	frontier	generated	affective	energies	needed	
for	missionary	work,	but	simultaneously	rendered	these	fragile.		
*	*	*	
This	section	has	focused	on	the	dark	side	of	the	frontier,	showing	that	the	dangers	that	
accompanied	its	allure	rendered	mission	work	fragile.	This	straightforward	principle,	
however,	was	confounded	by	the	various	missionary	strategies	to	stave	off	these	dangers.	
The	foundational	element	of	these	strategies	was	the	indigenization	of	missionary	work.	
While	foreign	evangelical	missionaries	were	active	in	all	kinds	of	support	roles,	it	was	
indigenous	Kyrgyzstani	Christians	who	did	the	actual	evangelization,	especially	outside	
Kyrgyztan’s	capital.	And	while	foreign	Tablighi	–	including	many	Pakistani	students	and	
businessmen	living	in	Bishkek	–	were	instrumental	in	strengthening	the	transnational	
networks	of	faith	and	took	part	in	locally	organised	dawats	to	the	provinces,	the	teams	
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(jamaats)	would	always	consist	primarily	of	Kyrgyzstani	dawatchis.	And	with	this	principle	of	
indigenization	came	the	more	subtle	yet	vital	adjustments	of	speech	and	conduct	that	
improved	the	efficacy	of	missionary	efforts,	allowing	them	to	extend	deeper	into	the	
frontier.	
		 The	Tablighi	practice	of	dawat	appeared	to	better	equipped	to	deal	with	frontier	
dangers	than	the	lone	evangelical	missionary	(or	even	missionary	family),	but	even	so	the	
dawatchis	eventually	had	to	return	to	their	everyday	lives	in	a	largely	secular	society.	
Mechanisms	for	dealing	with	frontier	dangers	were	certainly	not	failproof	and	could	not	
always	prevent	the	destabilization	of	missionary	work.	There	were	different	ways	of	dealing	
with	setbacks,	of	trying	to	minimize	or	neutralize	the	fallout.	The	Church	of	Jesus	Christ	
treated	backsliding	and	failure	as	collateral	damage	–	unavoidable	setbacks	in	the	struggle	
between	good	and	evil.	The	Tablighi	perspective	held	that	those	who	interrupted	their	
active	engagement	had	nevertheless	become	acquainted	with	a	truthful	life,	and	as	such	
contributed	to	an	underlying	current	on	which	new	waves	of	expansion	could	thrive.	But	
these	are	differences	of	emphasis	rather	than	of	kind.	They	both	attest	to	the	instable	
relational	qualities	of	the	frontier,	seen	not	just	as	located	on	the	margin,	but	as	part	of	
imperfect,	and	indeed	fragile,	projects.	
	
5.		 Frontier	Dynamics	
In	this	article	I	have	compared	two	religious	missions	into	Central	Asia,	highlighting	the	
forces	that	underpin	the	missionary	drive	as	well	as	those	that	destabilize	them.	Tablighis	
and	evangelical-Pentecostals	were	similarly	attracted	to	the	opportunities	and	challenges	
that	the	‘mission	field’	in	Kyrgyzstan	presented,	but	their	modes	of	engagement	differed.	
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Their	missions	were	differently	organized,	had	different	strategic	visions,	and	related	
differently	to	Kyrgyzstani	society,	all	of	which	influenced	the	various	outcomes.	But	beyond	
the	empirical	interest	of	comparing	recent	forms	of	missionary	activity	in	Central	Asia,	my	
aim	has	been	to	tease	out	several	larger	analytical	points,	and	I	will	use	this	final	section	to	
reflect	on	them.	Consecutively,	these	larger	points	refer	to	the	relative	value	of	
conceptualizing	the	mission	field	as	a	frontier	rather	than	a	market,	to	how	studying	
religious	frontiers	may	illuminate	other	kinds	of	frontiers,	and	to	an	analytic	understanding	
of	the	dynamics	that	constitute	frontiers.	
*	*	*	
As	discussed	in	the	introduction,	descriptions	of	post-Soviet	religious	landscapes	have	often	
relied	on	the	notion	of	the	market.	The	appeal	of	the	market	metaphor	was	easy	to	see	in	
the	case	of	Kyrgyzstan,	where	the	collapse	of	the	repressive	Soviet	regime	was	followed	by	a	
surge	in	religious	activity.24	Not	only	did	this	trend	appear	to	confirm	the	thesis	of	market	
theorists	of	religion	that	a	liberal	and	plural	religious	landscape	will	boost	religious	
vibrancy,25	the	market	concept	also	resonated	with	how	my	interlocutors	spoke	about	the	
religious	landscape	in	Kyrgyzstan.	If	state	officials	complained	that	‘religious	liberalization	
had	gone	too	far’,	missionaries	talked	about	the	‘freedom’	of	individuals	to	‘choose’	the	
right	path.	Moreover,	some	newly	active	religious	movements,	prominently	among	which	
were	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	and	evangelical-Pentecostalism,	have	thrived	under	conditions	of	
neoliberal	reform,	a	flourishing	that	cannot	be	wholly	separated	from	their	discursive	
reliance	on	‘choice’	and	‘freedom’,	terms	that	resonate	with	market	ideology	(Elisha	2015;	
Janson	2014).		
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As	long	as	we	are	aware	of	the	fact	that	‘markets’	are	shaped	by	forces	that	escape	
their	own	logics,	a	market	perspective	can	indeed	be	helpful	to	describe	‘how	people	
navigate	the	fragmented	religious	terrain	of	late	modernity’,	to	use	the	words	of	
Ališauskiene	and	Schröder	(2012:	4).26	However,	adopting	a	market	perspective	steers	the	
analytic	gaze	towards	the	(rational)	choices	and	(transactional)	exchanges	of	actors,	even	
when	the	religious	terrain	is	acknowledged	not	to	resemble	the	mythical	free	market.27	
What	a	market	perspective	tends	to	overlook	is	how	the	relational,	affective,	and	epistemic	
factors	drive	religious	actors	and	inform	the	encounters	between	them.	Hence,	if	we	want	
to	capture	how	‘religious	fields’	(or	markets)	are	shaped,	or	if	we	are	interested	in	what	
drives	religious	actors,	then	it	is	important	to	consider	alternative	(or	additional)	
perspectives.	For	the	analysis	of	missionary	work	in	newly	opened	or	destabilized	religious	
contexts	such	as	in	Central	Asia,	a	frontier	perspective	is	particularly	productive.	
The	frontier	as	margin	and	project	draws	immediate	attention	to	the	interplay	of	
positionality,	relationality,	and	directionality	in	missionary	work,	and	thereby	to	the	
affective	and	epistemic	dimensions	of	missionizing.	If	missionizing	was	about	‘selling	truth’,	
then	the	relevant	sales	took	place	within	complexly	constituted	relationships	and	were	
dependent	on	the	missionaries	maintaining	their	conviction.	And	even	if	missionaries	were	
motivated	by	the	prospect	of	future	gains,	then	these	gains	themselves	were	the	product	of	
the	mystique	of	the	frontier.	All	this	suggests	that	a	frontier	and	a	market	perspective	can	
be	profitably	combined	to	highlight	the	complexity	of	religious	activity,	and	to	show	how	on	
the	frontier	multiple	vectors	produce	a	configuration	that	acquires	its	own	dynamic.		
*	*	*	
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The	religious	frontier,	seen	as	both	margin	and	project,	can	be	profitably	compared	to	other	
kinds	of	frontiers.	Projections	of	superiority	and	the	interplay	of	allure	and	danger	are	
certainly	not	unique	to	the	religious	frontier.	These	issues	surface	in	writings	on	other	
frontier	situations,	including	those	pertaining	to	state	encapsulation,	extractive	capitalist	
expansion	and	(neo)imperial	civilizing	missions.	So	how	do	the	projections	of	superiority,	the	
anticipations	of	success,	and	the	worries	about	danger,	as	observed	among	Tablighi	and	
evangelical-Pentecostal	missionaries,	compare	to	the	visions	and	actions	of	other	pioneers?	
As	mentioned	above,	Russian	colonialism	projected	its	Eurocentric	ideas	of	
administrative	and	cultural	superiority	onto	Central	Asia,	with	the	aim	to	extend	the	
empire’s	sovereignty,	and	to	subject	and	transform	the	region’s	inhabitants	(Brower	and	
Lazzerini	1997).	And	to	reference	just	one	example	from	a	different	part	of	the	world,	
Driessen	shows	in	his	study	of	the	Hispano-African	frontier	that	ideas	of	governmental	and	
civilizational	superiority	merged	in	projects	aimed	at	pacification	and	submission	(1992:	
190).	However,	for	civilizational	projects	to	be	successful,	the	‘superior	truth’	needs	to	be	
translated	to	local	contexts;	progress	can	only	be	made	through	engagement	with	the	
targeted	populations.	The	evangelical-Pentecostal	and	Tablighi	missions	offered	a	
particularly	stark	view	of	the	tensions	involved,	because	the	success	of	proselytizing	fully	
depends	on	the	message	being	accepted	by	the	other,	without	allowing	the	Truth	to	be	
corrupted.	So,	although	indigenizing	the	missionary	effort	was	vital	to	success,	the	implied	
adjustments	risked	compromising	the	integrity	of	the	mission.		
The	anticipation	of	gains	in	the	face	of	difficulties	is	what	drives	numerous	frontier	
activities.	This	is	evidently	true	for	capitalist	frontiers,	where	the	presented	difficulties	
promise	an	increase	of	the	profits	to	be	had.	A	stark	illustration	of	this	logic	is	provided	by	
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Kuruüzüm’s	(2018)	study	‘Expanding	war,	expanding	capital’,	which	documents	and	analyses	
the	scrap	metal	industry	near	the	frontline	with	ISIS	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan	(circa	2015).	It	shows	
how	entrepreneurs	capitalized	on	existential	and	regulatory	uncertainties.	The	absence	of	
strong	competition	and	the	weakness	of	the	regulatory	framework	allowed	for	quick	
enrichment,	even	while	the	war-related	risks	destabilized	the	enterprise	as	a	whole.	This	
same	principle	occurs	in	other	‘resource	frontiers’,	with	the	challenges	posed	by	remote	
location,	the	complexity	of	technology,	or	the	hostility	of	the	socio-political	environment,	
each	of	which	allows	the	‘pioneering’	entrepreneurs	or	companies	to	have	an	edge	on	their	
competitors.28	Frontier	entrepreneurs,	usually	well	aware	of	the	temporary	nature	of	their	
activities,	‘are	not	seeking	to	impose	a	hegemonic	territorial	sovereignty’	but	aim	to	create	
profitable	transient	spaces	through	production	and	organisation	(Peluso	2018:	401).	The	
trade-offs	were	somewhat	different	on	the	religious	frontier	discussed	here	in	that	the	
missionaries	were	unlikely	to	produce	many	converts	in	the	most	hostile	places,	but	this	was	
(at	least	partly)	offset	by	the	heroism	associated	with	taking	the	spiritual	battle	to	the	
ultimate	frontier.	But	here	too,	the	evolving	regulatory	framework	and	intensifying	
competition	suggest	that	we	are	dealing	with	a	phenomenon	that	is	temporally	limited.		
Religious	missions	reveal	the	complex	interplay	between	assumed	superiority,	
opportunity,	and	risk	in	particularly	stark	detail.	This	has	everything	to	do	with	the	position	
of	missionaries	and	the	nature	of	their	work.	If	entrepreneurs	risk	bankruptcy	and	
administrators	risk	defiance	on	the	frontier,	missionaries	risk	both	severance	from	their	
religious	‘home’	and	confrontation	with	those	they	desire	to	convert.	The	link	with	the	
religious	‘home’	(the	church,	the	jamaat)	was	crucial	to	avoid	accusations	of	syncretism	or	
to	lose	sense	of	purpose.	The	sense	of	superiority,	moreover,	needed	to	be	recognized	and	
accepted	by	the	other	if	the	mission	was	to	succeed.	At	the	same	time,	it	was	precisely	in	
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relation	to	challenges	and	setbacks	that	a	sense	of	religious	purpose	and	significance	was	
obtained.	
*	*	*	
The	wildness	of	frontiers,	Anna	Tsing	writes,	‘is	both	material	and	imaginative’	(2005:	28-
29).	For	the	featured	missionaries	the	appeal	of	the	religious	frontier	was	that	in	the	
‘wilderness’	they	could	realize	their	purpose.	There,	they	could	imagine	themselves	as	
instruments	in	the	hands	of	God,	as	working	in	a	context	where	the	Truth	provided	hope	
and	salvation	to	shattered	lives.	The	encounter	with	poverty	and	public	drunkenness	
confirmed	to	the	Tablighis	that	only	in	Islam	can	one	find	purpose.	Similarly,	for	evangelicals	
the	evil-infused	destitution,	darkness,	and	hostility	they	encountered	affirmed	the	
importance	of	their	battle	against	satanic	forces.	The	potency	of	the	unknown	intensified	
the	sense	of	religious	purpose	and	superiority,	but	at	the	same	time	this	appeal	of	
unrealized	potential	was	counteracted	by	the	danger	of	the	unknown.	When	their	message	
was	ignored,	when	the	link	to	the	center	weakened,	or	when	opposing	powers	gathered	
force,	missionaries	risked	losing	their	bearings.		
Standing	at	the	junction	of	these	counteracting	forces,	the	frontier	emerges	as	a	
topological	object	that	is	‘organized	from	within	itself’	(Lury,	Parisi,	and	Terranova	2012:	7)	
and	has	its	own	momentum.	The	affective	energy	of	the	frontier	was	produced	through	the	
projection	of	superiority,	which	meant	that	conviction	peaked	as	missionaries	pushed	into	
the	frontier,	meanwhile	becoming	more	unstable.	As	in	the	figure	of	the	wave,	the	frontier	
spurs	on,	extends	its	reach,	gains	momentum,	and	releases	its	energy:	crashing,	flooding,	
receding.	The	shape,	direction,	and	force	are	constituted	by	the	affective	and	relational	
dimensions	of	the	figuration	itself,	revealing		the	frontier	as	a	topological	object	in	which	
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‘power	relationships	are	not	so	much	positioned	in	space	or	extended	across	it,	as	compose	
the	spaces	of	which	they	are	part’	(Allen	2011;	see	also	Harvey	2012:	77-78).	It	was	forward-
moving,	but	not	in	a	straightforwardly	territorial	manner.	As	Rasmussen	and	Lund	point	out	
in	their	discussion	of	resource	frontiers,	instead	of	‘moving	forward	in	time	and	space,	and	
hence	reaching	a	definite	end,	frontiers	can	emerge	and	vanish’	(2018:	390).	This	dynamic	
produced	a	fluctuation	of	conviction	and	doubt	amongst	the	missionaries,	whose	conviction	
peaked	when	confronted	with	manageable	challenges,	yet	which	receded	in	the	everyday,	
or	collapsed	in	the	face	of	overwhelming	resistance.	As	long	as	the	link	with	the	religious	
home	was	maintained,	the	image	of	truth	and	righteousness	could	be	projected	onto	the	
horizon.	But,	as	is	the	case	with	all	projections	onto	a	surface,	the	clarity	of	vision	vanishes	
when	critical	distance	is	lost,	thereby	laying	bare	the	frontier’s	central	contradiction.	
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1	This	article	is	based	on	materials	collected	during	twenty	months	of	ethnographic	
fieldwork	between	2003	and	2015.	
2	I	use	the	adjective	‘Kyrgyzstani’	as	a	civic	marker	(i.e.	relating	to	the	country	Kyrgyzstan)	
and	‘Kyrgyz’	as	an	ethno-national	marker	(i.e.	relating	to	the	Kyrgyz	nation).		
3	Archbishop	Vladimir,	for	example,	emphasized	that	Orthodox	Christianity	is	not	a	
proselytizing	faith	and	has	few	native	Central	Asian	adherents	(Vladimir	2000:	95).	In	1995	
Orthodox	Christian	and	Sunni	Muslim	representatives	jointly	declared	their	‘interest	in	
strengthening	the	spirit	of	Islam	amongst	the	Muslim	nations	and	the	Orthodox	Christian	
spirit	amongst	the	Slavic	populations,	in	recognition	that	those	creeds	are	a	legacy	of	our	
forefathers’	(cited	in	Vladimir	2002:	289).	
4	The	quote	is	from	Mark	Palmer,	coordinator	of	the	U.S.	based	mission	organization	
Campus	Crusade	for	Christ	in	Kyrgyzstan	between	1992	and	2004	(quoted	in	Pelkmans	2006:	
29).	
5	By	the	same	token	one	could	say	that	I	didn’t	consider	these	men	equal	conversation	
partners	either,	but	used	them	to	advance	my	research	interests,	and	moreover	objectified	
them	through	my	writing.	This	goes	to	show	that	issues	of	ideological	dominance	are	rarely	
straightforward	and	subject	to	logics	of	inversion	and	subversion,	as	is	certainly	true	on	the	
frontier,	as	we	will	see	below.	
6	The	Church’s	name	in	Russian	is	Tserkov’	Isusa	Khrista.	The	Church	of	Jesus	Christ	should	
not	be	confused	with	the	Mormon	Church	of	Jesus	Christ	of	Latter	Day	Saints,	with	which	it	
has	no	connection	whatsoever.	
7	For	detailed	discussions	of	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	in	Kyrgyzstan,	see	Balci	(2012),	Nasritdinov	
(2012),	Pelkmans	(2017:	102-123),	Reetz	(2017),	Toktogulova	(2014).	For	detailed	
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discussions	of	evangelical	Christianity	in	Kyrgyzstan	see	Borbieva	(2012),	Pelkmans	(2006;	
2007;	2017:	124-47);	Radford	(2015),	
8	As	Berger	and	Zijderveld	(2009:	7-12)	point	out,	‘pluralism’	highlights	the	erosion	of	
traditional	structures	and	the	appearance	of	new	religious	movements.	
9	Let	me	reemphasize	that	I	do	not	wish	to	discard	the	market	perspective.	Rather,	I	argue	
that	its	focus	on	choice,	exchange,	and	competition	creates	the	tendency	to	leave	other	
aspects	of	the	social	field	unseen.	The	perspectival	shift	applied	in	this	article	–	adopting	the	
prism	of	the	frontier	–	foregrounds	some	such	other	aspects,	allowing	us	to	examine	how	
relational,	affective,	and	epistemic	factors	influence	the	shape	and	dynamics	of	the	mission	
field.	
10	Using	Turner’s	own	words,	Limerick	shows	that	instead	of	being	self-reliant,	pioneers	
found	themselves	in	a	state	of	dependence	‘on	the	strong	arm	of	national	power’	(1995:	
700).	Other	critics	(e.g.	Bassin	1993)	have	pointed	out	that	the	availability	of	land	resulted	
not	so	much	in	innovation	as	in	wastefulness.		
11	Within	four	months	after	the	disintegration	of	the	USSR	in	1991	Kyrgyzstan	had	adopted	a	
religion	law	that	lifted	virtually	all	restrictions	on	religious	activity.	In	contrast	to	what	
happened	in	neighbouring	countries	this	law	was	actually	implemented,	and	until	around	
2008	state	interference	in	religious	affairs	was	minimal.	During	this	period,	however,	
political	actors	increasingly	opined	that	religious	liberalization	that	‘had	gone	too	far’	
(Murzakhalilov	2004,	pp.	86-87).	This	set	the	stage	for	more	restrictive	legislation,	with	the	
first	such	law	(which	prohibited	proselytization)	adopted	in	2008.	Due	to	ongoing	political	
turmoil	and	limited	state	capacity	the	implementation	of	this	law	has	been	slow	and	uneven	
(see	Pelkmans	2014	for	details).	
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12	The	concept	of	the	‘network’	that	Mol	and	Law	(1994)	advance	relies	on	Latour’s	idea	of	
the	‘immutable	mobile’	–	that	which	(ostensibly)	stays	the	same	when	it	moves	(or	is	
replicated)	across	space	and	time.		
13	In	the	evangelical	context,	the	term	‘frontier’	features	in	names	such	as	the	Frontier	
Missions	journal	and	the	International	Journal	of	Frontier	Missions,	and	in	mission	
organizations	such	as	Frontiers	(http://frontiers.org/)	which	targets	the	Muslim	world.	
14	In	the	mid-1990s	the	U.S.	based		International	Journal	of	Frontier	Missions	devoted	at	
least	six	articles	to	mission	work	in	Central	Asia,	focusing	on	unreached	people	in	
Kazakhstan,	Tajikistan,		Uzbekistan,	Mongolia	Turkmenistan,	and	Kyrgyzstan	(vol.10,	issue	1,	
2;	vol.11,	issue	2	and	3;	vol.12,	issue	1;	vol.15	issue	1).	
15	The	book	Kazhdyi	Khristianin	–	Missioner	(Every	Christian	is	a	Missionary)	originally	
appeared	in	English	under	the	title	The	World	Christian	Starter	Kit,	written	by	Glenn	Myers	
(1986).	
16	Similarly,	the	church’s	weekly	newspaper	Tvoi	Put’:	Khristanskaia	Gazeta	always	
contained	several	exemplary	stories	of	how	congregants	had	received	God’s	grace.		
17	I	have	described	this	event	in	more	detail	elsewhere	(Pelkmans	2007:	881-883).	
18	Metcalf	mentions	that	Tablighis	in	South	Asia	refer	to	their	activities	as	jihad,	understood	
as	effort	or	struggle	(2002:	11).	My	Tablighi	acquaintances	in	Kyrgyzstan	never	mentioned	
jihad	but	instead	spoke	of	dawat	to	talk	about	these	efforts.	
19	That	is	to	say,	Baumann’s	(2004)	reminder	that	the	Orientalizing	gaze	is	not	only	
condescending	of	primitiveness	but	also	desiring	of	lost	purity	similarly	applies	to	
evangelical	and	Tablighi	missionaries.	
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20	The	deputy	director	made	this	comment	in	2009,	after	I	asked	him	about	a	new	religion	
law	that	explicitly	forbade	proselytization,	but	which	was	not	enforced	in	the	case	of	the	
Tablighi	Jamaat.	For	a	discussion	of	the	evolving	legal	situation,	see	Pelkmans	(2014).	
21	Invoking	to	the	movement’s	‘dry	dock	parable’,	Mohamed	Tozy	compares	worldly	life	to	a	
ship	in	trouble	in	tumultuous	sea	which	can	only	be	repaired	in	the	‘dry-dock’	of	the	jamaat	
or	the	mosque	(Tozy	2000:	166).	
22	A	sample	of	this	evangelical	glorification	of	the	lone	missionary	can	be	found	in:	Vance	
Christie	(2004)	Into	all	the	World:	Four	Stories	of	Pioneer	Missionaries.	Barbour	Publishing.	
23	Richard/Risbek	wrote	several	books	about	this,	the	first	of	which	appeared	in	English	and	
in	Kyrgyz	as	Ak	Kalpak	in	2003.	In	later	years	he	wrote	a	more	elaborate	account,	which	was	
also	self-published,	and	appeared	as:	Risbek	(Richard	Hewitt).	2012.	Manas	Lost	&	Found:	A	
Bridge	Linking	Kyrgyzstan’s	Epic	to	Ancient	Oracles.	
24	Peter	van	der	Veer	has	similarly	argued	for	China	that	a	main	reason	for	the	popularity	of	
a	market	perspective	in	studies	of	religion	is	its	history	of	religious	repression	(2012:	184).	
25	This	is	a	central	argument	in	market	theories	of	religion,	not	least	in	the	foundational	
work	of	Rodney	Stark	and	Roger	Finke	(e.g.	2000).	It	is	perhaps	ironic	that	although	their	
student	Paul	Froese	agrees	that	the	end	of	Soviet	Union	saw	a	clear	increase	of	religious	
movements	(the	supply	side),	he	concludes	for	the	demand	side	that	“pluralism	appears	to	
have	no	effect	on	religious	growth”	across	the	region	(2008:	145,	154).	
26	For	the	case	of	Kyrgyzstan,	Stefan	Kirmse’s	Youth	and	Globalization	in	Central	Asia	(2013)	
offers	a	particularly	useful	and	nuanced	example	of	such	an	approach.	The	work	of	Gauthier,	
Martikainen,	and	Woodhead	(2013)	is	a	powerful	example	of	a	market	approach	that	is	
attentive	to	its	moral	construction.	
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27	These	problems	have	often	been	discussed.	To	offer	just	a	few	examples:	Van	der	Veer	
(2012)	points	out	that	the	focus	on	choice	does	not	only	reflect	an	individualist	bias,	but	
tends	to	reduce	human	behaviour	to	maximization	of	gains;	Steve	Bruce	argues	that	a	focus	
on	transaction	overlooks	what	he	considers	to	be	the	essence	of	religion	–	its	emotive,	
epistemic	and	relational	qualities	(1999).	On	the	point	of	transactional	exchange	(and	
looking	beyond	the	field	of	religion),	it	is	useful	to	quote	Hochschild’s	‘market	frontiers’	
(2011),	a	term	she	uses	to	think	about	how	the	logic	of	exchange	may	give	way	to	other	
logics	such	as	those	of	morality	and	emotion.	In	her	study	of	surrogacy	she	shows	how	the	
boundary	between	the	logics	of	exchange,	morality,	and	emotion	is	being	pushed	back	and	
forth,	meaning	that	the	‘market’	is	a	fluctuating	and	contingent	process	that	needs	to	be	
explained	and	should	not	be	assumed	to	describe	a	pre-existing	‘field’.	
28	The	dynamic	is	more	than	a	surface	feature	–	it	is	central	to	political,	economic,	and	
religious	projects	of	expansion	and	intensification.	Jason	W.	Moore,	in	Capitalism	in	the	Web	
of	Life,	goes	as	far	to	suggest	that	capitalism	‘is	a	frontier	process:	endless	accumulation	and	
endless	geographical	appropriation	are	jointed	at	the	hip’	(2015:	107).	
